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 In the midst of health care reform, Colombia has succeeded in increasing health insurance coverage and the quality 
of health care. In spite of this, efficiency continues to be a matter of concern, and small-area variations in health care 
are one of the plausible causes of such inefficiencies. In order to understand this issue, we use individual data of all 
births from a Contributory-Regimen insurer in Colombia. We perform two different specifications of a multilevel 
logistic regression model.  Our results reveal  that hospitals  account for 20% of variation on  the probability of 
performing  cesarean sections.  Geographic area only  explains 1/3 of the  variance  attributable to the hospital. 
Furthermore, some variables from both demand and supply sides are found to be also relevant on the probability of 
undergoing cesarean sections. This paper contributes to previous research by using a hierarchical model and by 
defining hospitals as cluster. Moreover, we also include clinical and supply induced demand variables. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Developing countries are currently experiencing rising cesarean rates whereas countries with the best 
birth outcomes continue to have low cesarean section rates (Althabe et al., 2006; Villar et al., 2006). In 
1985, the World Health Organization stated that cesarean rates should not be higher than 15%. Even 
though rule of thumb for almost 25 years old, it reflects that this is an alarming issue. Concerns about 
cesarean section rates arise from its potential medical complications and the rising costs the procedure 
represents for government and insurers. Cesarean section is a major surgical procedure and can cause 
medical  complications  including  wound infection, respiratory distress, neonatal sepsis and death for 
mother and child (Iams and Chawla, 1984; MacDorman et al., 2006; 2009; Tita et al., 2009). Since 
diseases related to pregnancy and delivery are the main non-violent cause of death among women in 
reproductive age (Ministry of social Protection and Pan American Health Organization, 2007)  and 
Colombia is ranked as the third highest country in Latin America in performing cesarean sections (30% 
cesarean sections on excess according to Belizán et al. in 1999), this should be considered as a high 
priority issue in this country.  
 
As with other procedures in the health sector, the performance of the cesarean section has changing 
and controversial criteria, and  most of them  show a  lack of rigorous efficacy and cost-effectiveness 
support. On the background of informational asymmetry between physicians and patients, this lack of 
evidence regarding the effectiveness and efficiency on the performance of cesarean sections leaves a grey 
zone, allowing health care agents (insurers, hospitals and physicians) to respond to the incentives they 
face.  
 
Research on “small-area variation in health care” has become a relevant research topic since the 
Glover’s initial paper in 1938. Later, a cluster of research (performed mostly between 1970 and 1990) has 
assessed several procedures in health care in developed countries, with most of them taking place in the 
United States. In 1993, Phelps and Mooney brought out their seminal paper on regional variations, and 
became the referential framework to analyze variations in health care thereafter. “Small-area variation in 
health care” is usually defined as the systematic variability on the probability of performing a given 
procedure across “small areas”. The concept of “small area” may range from small geographical regions 
(such as counties and towns), to entire countries. However, because the definition of “small area” may 
not represent legal, financial or practice-style effects, each “small area” might not affect homogeneously 
the choice of a given procedure.  
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Concerns on small-area variation on health care arise from the potential welfare losses they produce. 
Despite the fact that some variability is acceptable between regions conditioned on disease prevalence, 
insurance coverage and availability of resources, systematic variability yields welfare losses in both users 
and non-users of a given service. More precisely, welfare losses in users arise from the production of non-
optimal amounts of services for them with regards to more appropriate substitute services, even if no 
procedure is performed (Phelps and Mooney, 1993). In non-users, systematic variability generates welfare 
losses, because socially-inefficient allocation of resources creates social marginal costs that are greater 
than social marginal benefits (Phelps and Parente, 1990).  The excessive or deficient provision of a given 
procedure generates welfare losses both directly and indirectly. 
 
Since Colombia faced health reform 15 years ago, such sector restructure brought about considerable 
changes in the national health care market,  increasing the coverage and supply  of health services. 
However, through these years, as financing grows slower than the plan of benefits,
4
Individual-level and hospital-level data on all births during 2007 from a Contributory Regimen health 
insurer (EPS-C) are used. As a result of the objectives previously stated, we do not aim to infer our results 
at the national level but only to use a highly reliable single-insurer database.  The first level of analysis is 
comprised by births whereas the second one is identified by hospital. Two different specifications for the 
error term on a multilevel logistic regression model are performed. In the first specification, this paper 
finds that 20% of the variance on the performance of cesarean sections is attributable to differences 
between hospitals. In the second specification, we show that 1/3 of the variance attributable to the hospital 
is explained by Regional differences. The remaining 2/3 of this variance is due to the hospital clustering 
effect.  We also found that wealthier and more educated mothers, as well as those attended in a private 
 the rationing of 
health care services according to efficiency  criteria  has become the first priority  for insurers and 
government sector.  
 
This paper attempts to contribute to “small-area variation in health care” research line in several 
ways. To our knowledge, this is the first paper using hierarchical econometric methods which takes 
hospitals uses as unit of analysis rather than geographic regions. The rationale behind this conceptual 
model is that hospitals’ policy and environment may exert a considerable influence on the choice of the 
physician in a determined procedure. In addition, earlier research has focused on developed countries; this 
paper can be used to fill the gap by studying this issue in developing countries. Finally, we control for 
supply induced demand and clinical data at the individual-level, which allows us to go through the effects 
of both variables on the choice of the delivery procedure.  
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facility, are more likely to undergo a cesarean section.  In addition, we found that physicians’ fees are 
positively correlated with the performance of cesarean sections, confirming a supply induced demand 
effect.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review of research on “small-
area variations on health care and defines an approach to this issue through the seminal work of Phelps 
and Mooney (1993). Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of the data and includes descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents the empirical strategy detailing both multilevel analysis specifications.  Section 5 
presents results from both multilevel specifications. In section 6, our results are discussed. Section 7 
states our conclusions and policy recommendations.  
 
 
2  Background 
 
Small-area variation in health care is first described by Glover (1938) when he found that cities in the 
United Kingdom had different tonsillectomy rates with no evidence of different tonsillitis incidence. 
Through an analysis of the data, Glover concluded that some cities were performing tonsillectomies “in 
excess of the essential minimum”. Later on, other influential papers on small-area variations using linear 
approaches and aggregate-level data have been published (Cromwell and Mitchell, 1986; Mc Pherson et 
al., 1982).  Using a panel data approach, Bech and Lauridsen (2007) find more than 50% of variability 
between municipalities. This paper constitutes an important contribution  to this field, as they used 
longitudinal data.
5
Usually, approaches focusing on the demand side discuss two main aspects: patients’ preferences and the 
demographic characteristics of population.  The effect of consumers’ preferences is highly relevant on the 
final choice of performing a given procedure since they might shape the decision either for or against a 
given procedure by persuading their physician. Even though patients’ preferences are expected to have 
stronger effects under out-of-pocket payments (Bardey and Lesur, 2006), they also may play a role in 
their  absence  (Hsu  et al., 2008). Such preferences are mainly  determined by cultural and “social 
  
 
 Phelps and Money (1993) provide a seminal paper explaining small area variations from a demand-
supply side approach. In this  analysis,  both users and healthcare providers cause variations across 
geographic areas. This demand-supply side approach is followed in this paper hereafter. 
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inheritance” factors. Cultural factors are comprised mostly by the perception of cesarean section as a less 
painful, easier and a more convenient procedure than vaginal delivery (Fabri and Murta, 2002; Tschudin 
et al., 2009). Empirical evidence for “social inheritance”, as called in Tollånes et al. (2008), shows that 
women are more likely to experience the same delivery procedure their mothers had. Although they do 
not discard the involvement of genetic features, they point out that “social inheritance” becomes a more 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon. Demographic characteristics are also important in determining 
the intensity of using health services, as some specific services might be affected by factors related to age, 
gender, or ethnicity. For instance, Internal Medicine Services are demanded more in elderly populations 
while more fertile populations demand more obstetric and pediatric services (Phelps and Money, 1993). 
 
Small-area variations from the supply side are mainly determined by informational asymmetries that 
characterize  health care  markets (Phelps and Money, 1993). On the one hand, health  care providers 
benefit from information asymmetries regarding quality, which is hardly observable by patients, making 
them less quality-sensitive and lowering competition. As health care providers make up the link between 
the patient and the insurer, they function as “double agents” (Blomqvist, 1991). Such asymmetries yield 
two main factors with effects on the variability of procedures; the incentives physicians face and their 
own preferences. Availability of technology and institutional guidelines also play a role in determining 
small-area variations (Phelps, 1993). Furthermore, physicians’ sensitivity to the remuneration generates 
supply induced demand behaviours. It has been largely studied that the remuneration scheme may affect 
the procedure that providers choose. Indeed, supply induced demand is the ability of the providers to 
deliver a quantity/quality of health care different than the one her patient would choose if she had the 
same information (Labelle et al., 1994). This phenomenon involves a principal-agent problem where 
physician (agent) participates in the decision-making process and owns privileged information regarding 
the quality of the service and available technology (such as evidence-based medicine recommending or 
not a given procedure). Thus, the physician is able to take advantage of this informational asymmetry to 
recommend the most profitable choice for her. Roughly speaking, the physician maximizes her utility 
upon the chosen procedure, regardless of the patients’ utility (Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981).  
 
In addition  to the incentives issue, physicians’  preferences  are  also  important in determining the 
choice of procedures from the supply-side factor, even though there is much controversy regarding the 
evidence confirming such effect (Epstein and Nicholson, 2009;  Grytten  and  Sørensen,  2003;  Stano, 
1991). Physicians’  preferences are often referred  as “school effects” (Phelps and Mooney, 1993) or 
“practice styles” (Wennberg, 1985; Wenneberg and Gittelsohn, 1973). These preferences are caused by 
differences in information regarding the available technology (which includes guidelines and evidence-
based medicine) to which physicians are exposed during their training and professional practice. This 6 
 
implies that two physicians may develop divergent criteria throughout their carrier regarding the 








Despite our efforts in obtaining data at the national-level, we face a trade-off between heterogeneous, 
low quality and incomplete national-level data and homogeneous, high quality and reliable information 
from a single insurer.  As a result, we chose to use a single insurer database
6.  This data comes from a 
private and for-profit insurance company operating at the national-level for the Contributory Regimen 
(EPS-C). Data coming from administrative and RIPS records (Individual Registry of Health Care 
Services) on all births happened during 2007 have been obtained (11,768). A sample comprising 98.5% of 
the original  data was selected. As  16 births were delivered in low-complexity facilities where no 
infrastructure to perform cesarean sections was available (and therefore, no possibility of choosing the 
delivery procedure), these observations are excluded from the analysis. Five observations had missing 
information regarding the hospital in which the delivery happened. Births delivered at hospitals with less 
than 10 observations (142 observations) are also excluded to ensure the suitability of the model
7
                                                 
6 This choice is based on the aims of the paper,  which are 1) to  contribute to present research using a hierarchical econometric 
approach, which defines hospitals as clusters and also includes clinical and supply inducement data 2) to make Colombian 
policymakers aware that this is an actual issue that health sector is facing. 
 
7. Snidjers and Bosker (1993) explain how a sample of at least ten individuals for each group is a conservative way to optimize 
the estimation efficiency in multilevel analysis. 
 
. 
Moreover, during the period of analysis, some hospitals performed either only cesarean sections or only 
natural deliveries. As these might be hospitals agreeing contracts with the insurer only for specific 
procedures (for example, a high-complexity hospital might arrange a contract with the insurer to perform 
only cesarean sections referred from other hospitals), hospitals in which only one type of procedure is 
observed are also excluded from the analysis.  Ultimately, 174 observations were excluded yielding a 






3.1.1  Hospital variables 
 
Variables at the hospital level are obtained in order to understand their effects on the choice of either 
cesarean section or natural delivery. Hospitals in Colombia are classified as low, medium and high 
complexity. Whereas low complexity facilities provide mostly ambulatory services, middle complexity 
hospitals provide in-patient and surgical services for general specialties (internal medicine, pediatrics, 
gynecology and general surgery). High complexity  institutions  (tertiary-care level) provide high-
specialized services such as intensive-care units and subspecialties. As births delivered in low complexity 
facilities were excluded from the study, a dummy variable accounting for high complexity facilities is 
designed. High complexity is a variable taking a value of 1 if the delivery was attended at a tertiary-care 
hospital and 0 otherwise (medium-complexity hospital).  
 
Following the previous literature (Grant, 2009; Gruber et al, 2009), as all physicians worked on a fee-
for-service basis, a supply induced demand variable reporting the effect of physician remuneration on the 
choice of the delivery procedure is designed as follows: 
 
( )









where Wi represents the actual fee the physician receives for carrying out the birth i. CesWj and NatWj are 
the average fees received by physicians working at hospital j for performing respectively a cesarean 
section or a natural delivery. Ces takes value of 1 if the delivery procedure was cesarean section and 0 
otherwise.  This  variable accounts for the average difference between the actual and the alternative 
procedure’s fee within each hospital. The rationale for this variable is to describe the incentive faced by 
the physician for the chosen procedure; for example, the value for performing a vaginal delivery is the 
differential fee between performing a vaginal delivery and a cesarean section at that hospital. As there is a 
considerable overlapping on the values of physician’ fees for both cesarean sections and natural 
deliveries, there are no simultaneous identification of this variables with the dependent one. 
 
Region of the hospital location is also categorized according to previous Colombian research on health 
issues (Castano and Zambrano, 2006; Vecino-Ortiz, 2008).  Such regions were categorized as follows; 
Bogotá D.C, Central Region (Antioquia, Quindío, Risaralda, Caldas), Pacific Ocean Region (Valle del 
Cauca, Cauca and Nariño), Eastern Region and Caribbean Region (Bolivar, Magdalena and Atlántico). It 
is worth noticing that, as this is a single-insurer case, the patient distribution among departments does not 
correspond to the population distribution. Public hospital is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 8 
 
hospital is public and 0 if private. Teaching hospital is also a dummy variable that accounts for hospitals 
that conduct  research, and have  relationships with medical schools on a regular basis (Epstein  and 
Nicholson, 2009; Grant, 2009; Jaramillo et al., 2008).  
 
3.1.2  Individual variables 
 
A set of individual-level variables is used. Mother age is the mother’s age at the time of birth. Mother 
income is the value in hundred thousand pesos of the reported income to the insurer during the last month. 
Users per contract is a variable accounting for the number of people covered under the family group. This 
variable is included as a proxy for family size which may play an effect as suggested in Tollånes et al. 
(2008). Educational level is controlled using three variables: Primary education accomplished, Secondary 
education accomplished  and  Superior education level accomplished.  Superior level education 
accomplished  includes technical and professional education. In addition, a variable for unknown 
educational level  was included since in 4,922 observations education information is  not provided. 
Mother’s labor information is categorized as Dependent worker, Self-employed worker and No working 
currently.  
 
In order to control for health factors, some clinical variables are also included. Previous births are the 
number of births a woman had before this delivery. Type of admission describes whether the admission 
was urgent or scheduled. Female takes values of 1 if the newborn is female and 0 if male. Even though 
data on prenatal care and other prevention activities and gestational age, were requested, these data were 
not available.  
 
The last individual variable is Cesarean section criterion. The categorization was developed following 
Flamm and Quilligan (1995) and Ministry of Social Protection (2000). Since complications are listed in 
the database as ICD-10 codes (International Classification of Diseases, version 10), the imputation of 
whether that intervention requires cesarean section or not is based only on the ICD-10 diagnosis and on 
the common treatment upon such ICD-10 diagnosis. Two values are imputed for this variable, 1 if that 
complication requires cesarean section (according to previously discussed  literature)  and  0  if such 
complication either does not require cesarean section or is not related to the procedure.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
From this sample (11,594 births), 35.33% of births (4,096) are delivered by cesarean section. In Table 








Supply induced demand* -0.55 2.69 -14.78 14.78
Mother income* 5.34 1.55 0.00 19.87
Previous deliveries 0.24 0.54 0.00 6.00
Users per contract 1.10 0.31 1.00 5.00
* Value in hundred of thousand pesos





 with a standard deviation of 469,000 pesos ($225.66). Mothers mean income is 534,000 
pesos ($256.93) with a standard deviation of 155,000 pesos ($74.58). Mean of previous deliveries is 0.24. 
Average users per contract in this sample are 1.10. 
 
Overall, as shown in Table 3, a high proportion of deliveries are attended at high-complexity, private 
and non-teaching hospitals, most of them at the Central region (Medellin). 80.9% of mothers were 
between 19 and 35 years old. Female/male proportions are as expected and almost 90% of births were 
admitted as urgent. 27.60% of mothers did  not declare their level of education, whereas 42.45% of 
mothers did not complete primary education and 18.33% completed secondary education. Almost 90% of 
mothers were dependent workers and only 1% was not currently working. Regarding the cesarean section 




                                                 




















Less than 18 years old 10.04%
18 to 35 years old 80.90%





Unknown mother education 27.60%
Mother education less than completed primary  42.45%
Mother completed primary education 7.01%
Mother completed secondary education 18.33%
























4  Empirical strategy 
 
Multilevel logistic regression analysis is carried out since it provides estimates of the hospital-
attributable variance on the probability of performing the delivery procedure. This method also shows the 
effects of a set of independent variables on such probability. 
 
4.1 Multilevel logistic regression model 
 
Multilevel logistic regression is the dichotomous dependent-variable variant of the Multilevel 
Regression Model. Multilevel regression models belong to the “Hierarchical Models Family” and are 
frequently used with data with complex variability patterns arising from clusters or nested data (Snijders 
and  Bosker, 1999). The technical advantage of this methodology relies on the error term structure. 
Whereas linear or logistic regression models exhibit one error term for the whole equation, multilevel 
analysis generates one error term for each level, allowing the researcher to isolate the individual-level and 
group-level residual variance. 
 
Overall, multilevel logistic regression model estimates the cluster-dependent probabilities’ distribution 
(variance) of the binary dependent variable. Multilevel logistic regression comprises two subtypes of 
models known as the “empty model” and the “random-intercept model”. The main difference between 
both models is that the first one does not take into account any explanatory variable, whereas the 
“random-intercept model” does it. It means that whereas in the “empty model”, the observed probability 
of success varies across the groups, in the “random-intercept model” such probability varies across 
individuals instead. As a result of the “empty model” parameters, the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
(ICC) may be calculated. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient represents the fraction of variance on the 
binary-dependent variable attributable to the differences between groups (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 




In the specifications this analysis performs, births are taken as units of observation (level-one units) 
and hospitals as groups of analysis (level-two units). As our interest is to estimate not only the hospital 
but also the region effect on the choice of the delivery procedure, region is initially considered as a 
potential third level in the model. However, a small number of regions where hospitals are located (five 
geographic regions) prevent us from an accurate analysis of region as a level, given that standard errors in 12 
 
multilevel analysis are not well understood when the number of groups is small (Raundenbush, 1989; 
Snijders  and  Bosker, 1993). Nonetheless, we overcome this issue by using an alternative variance 
decomposition specification. Such specification (from now on, Model 2) takes the region as a random 
residual in order to isolate the residuals accounting for the region effect on the hospital variability from 
the remaining residuals (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008).  
 
As a result, two different sets of models, differing on the residual structure specification, are carried 
out. In the following reduced models, Yij is the dummy of the dependent variable, taking values of 1 if a 
cesarean section is performed and 0 otherwise for the birth i in the hospital j. Whereas Pj represents the 
constant of the regression for the empty model, Pij is a vector that characterizes both the constant and the 




In the first specification, both empty and random-intercept models are performed with the residual Rij 
accounting for the whole residual variance of the individual i within the group j. 
 
 
•  Empty:                                      j j j R P Y + =




•  Random-intercept:                    ij ij ij R P Y + =                                                           (3) 
                                                           
Model 2 
 
In the second specification, where variance decomposition is performed, µij represents the residual 
accounting for the effect of the region and the ɛ ij  residual comprises the remaining effect of the 
individual i within the group j for  Rij  ≈ µij + ɛ ij. 
 
 
•  Empty:                                      j j j j R P Y ε + + =




•  Random-intercept                      ij ij ij ij R P Y ε + + =
                                                
(5) 13 
 
Variance inflation factor and conditional numbers techniques have been also performed to confirm the 
absence of multi-collinearity between variables.  
 
 
5  Results 
 
In this paper, a comparative assessment between two specifications on the probability of undergoing a 
cesarean section versus vaginal delivery is performed using multilevel analysis (including empty and 
random-intercept models). 
Specification Model ɣ0 τ
2
0 π0 var (Pj) ICC
Model 1 Empty model (constant) - 0.3731 0.8454 0.4078 0.0493 0.2044
Empty model (constant) - 0.5631 0.4947 0.3628 0.0264 0.1307
 Empty model (region)     - 0.5631 0.2364 0.3628 0.0126 0.0671
Model 2
Table 4. Variance Results and Intraclass Correlation Coefficients
 
 
5.1 Empty-model results. Intraclass correlation coefficients 
 
In Table 4 and 5, parameters from empty model analysis to calculate the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) are presented. ɣ 0  represents the constant of the regression, τ
2
0  is the random effect of 
the regression, π0 is the logistic transformation of the constant and var (Pj) denotes the variance of the 
probability of producing a cesarean section in the hospital j. In model 1, intraclass correlation coefficient 
accounts for 20.44% of the variance in the sample. In other words, one fifth of variability of  the 
probability of developing a cesarean section is due to differences between hospitals.  
 
In model 2 a variance decomposition specification shows the inter-hospital variance attributable to the 
region effect. This model finds that almost 7% of the variance on the probability of undergoing a cesarean 
section is caused by the effect of region (approximately one third out of the hospital variance), whereas 






5.2 Random-intercept results 
 
In Table 5, random-intercept multilevel logistic regression results are displayed. Supply induced 
demand variable and hospitals located in the Caribbean Region are significant and positive in predicting 
the performance of cesarean sections. Public hospitals are less likely to perform cesarean sections than 
their private counterparts. Higher-income mothers and those with previous deliveries are more likely to 
undergo a cesarean section. Moreover, mothers who completed any kind of superior education show a 
strong association with undergoing a cesarean section. Accomplishment of cesarean section criteria 





High complexity 0.0685 ( 0.2649 ) 0.0684 ( 0.2649 )
Supply induced demand 0.0459 ** ( 0.023 ) 0.0459 ** ( 0.023 )
Hospital located at Bogota region 1 1
Hospital located at Central region 0.2263 ( 0.2385 ) 0.2262 ( 0.2386 )
Hospital located at Pacific region 0.5726 ( 0.4022 ) 0.5725 ( 0.4022 )
Hospital located at Eastern region 0.3610 ( 0.3444 ) 0.3609 ( 0.3444 )
Hospital located at Caribbean region 2.3513 *** ( 0.3490 ) 2.3511 *** ( 0.3490 )
Public hospital - 0.5447 ** ( 0.2585 ) - 0.5447 ** ( 0.2585 )
Teaching hospital 0.2463 ( 0.2242 ) 0.2463 ( 0.2243 )
Individual variables
Mother less than 18 years old - 0.1888 *** 0.0732 - 0.1888 *** 0.0732
Mother between 19 and 35 years old 1 1
Mother more than 36 years old 0.5984 *** ( 0.0694 ) 0.5984 *** ( 0.0694 )
Mother income 0.0714 *** ( 0.0137 ) 0.0714 *** ( 0.0137 )
Previous deliveries 0.3800 *** ( 0.0440 ) 0.3800 *** ( 0.0440 )
Users per contract - 0.0731 ( 0.0666 ) - 0.0731 ( 0.0666 )
Female 0.0255 ( 0.0411 ) 0.0255 ( 0.0411 )
Unknown mother education 0.0775 ( 0.0506 ) 0.0775 ( 0.0506 )
Mother education less than completed primary  1 1
Mother completed primary education - 0.0043 ( 0.0845 ) - 0.0043 ( 0.0845 )
Mother completed secondary education 0.0463 ( 0.0591 ) 0.0463 ( 0.0591 )
Mother completed any kind of superior education  0.3053 *** ( 0.1073 ) 0.3053 *** ( 0.1073 )
Dependent worker 1 1
Self-employed worker 0.1383 * ( 0.0717 ) 0.1383 * ( 0.0717 )
No working - 0.2227 ( 0.2159 ) - 0.2227 ( 0.2159 )
C-section criteria accomplished 0.9284 *** ( 0.1147 ) 0.9284 *** ( 0.1147 )
Constant - 0.3731 *** ( 0.1433 ) - 1.0103 *** ( 0.3286 ) - 0.5631 *** ( 0.1316 ) - 1.0102 *** ( 0.3287 )
Variance
Random effect of constant 0.8454 ( 0.1180 ) 0.4528 ( 0.0789 ) 0.4947 ( 0.1391 ) 0.4529 ( 0.0790 )
Random effect of region 0.2364 ( 0.0572 ) 0.0851 ( 0.0310 )
*     Significance at 10.00%.
**   Significance at 5.00%.
*** Significance at 1.00%.
n=11594
Coefficient
Wald Chi2 (Prob > Chi2)= 367.43 (0.0000) Wald Chi2 (Prob > Chi2)= 367.42 (0.0000)
(Standard error) (Standard error) Coefficient
n=11594 n=11594
Coefficient (Standard error) (Standard error)
Table 5. Marginal Effects of Logistic Multilevel Model
Model 1 Model 2
Variables
Empty model Random intercept model
Coefficient
n=11594
Empty model Random intercept model
  
6  Discussion 
 
Applying multilevel analysis to mothers belonging to a single insurer in Colombia, clustering from 
both hospitals and region has been demonstrated. Roughly 20% of variance is attributable to the gathering 
effect of medical facilities. Nonetheless, through an alternative specification of the error term, we find 
that one third of such variance is attributable to the effect of the geographic area. Focusing on the causes 
of these clustering effects according to Phelps and Money’s approach (1993), some hypothesis  are 
suggested. Differences in the independent variables between both specifications have not been found 
confirming consistency between both models. 
 
On the demand side, it is possible that mothers’  preferences play a key role in the decision of 
undergoing a cesarean section. An extensive amount of literature has been published demonstrating the 
effect of mother preferences on the performance of cesarean section (Blomqvist and Christiansen, 2004; 
Hsu et al., 2008; Tollånes et al., 2008). In this analysis, Region might be capturing a systematic effect on 
mothers’  preferences, for instance, a cultural-related acceptance or rejection to cesarean section. 
Regarding region, this analysis reveals that mothers attended in the Caribbean Region are more likely to 
undergo cesarean sections. Despite that  the fact that  we cannot isolate the supply effect, mothers’ 
preferences might be shaping this effect; for this reason, further analyses isolating supply and demand 
effects are highly recommended.  However, mothers’ preferences become evident when observing that 
wealthier and more educated mothers are more likely to undergo a cesarean section. In the Colombian 
health system, there are no differential out-of-pocket payments on the choice between both procedures, 
such as copayments or fees. Therefore, on a background of information asymmetry between physicians 
and mothers with  physicians having  privileged information, mothers might  make non-maximizing 
choices. On the one hand, higher-income mothers might perceive higher expected costs in terms of sick 
leaves, pain or merely “inconvenience” from undergoing a natural delivery, leading them to persuade the 
physician to perform a cesarean section (Barbosa et al., 2003; Fabri and Murta, 2002; Tschudin et al., 
2009; Walker et al., 2004). On the other hand, higher-income mothers might be more likely to undergo a 
cesarean section due to the “social inheritance effect” (Tollånes et al., 2008). Because of higher-income 
mothers have a larger probability of being born by cesarean section during the former National Health 
System (because wealthier mothers often were attended under fee-for-service arrangements where the 
supply induced demand is characteristic), they might be more likely to prefer a cesarean section as well. 
Other aspects of demand like clustering of complicated deliveries among small regions must also be 
considered. Low socioeconomic conditions of a certain population covered by a given hospital might lead  
to more complicated births and hence, to be more likely to end up in cesarean sections (Chhabra et al., 
2006).  
 
On the supply side, hospital and physician factors might also be affecting the variation on the choice 
of the procedure of delivery. Hospitals  often have clinical guidelines on the criteria of performing 
procedures. This might partially explain clustering of procedures at the hospital level demonstrating the 
relevance of considering the hospital as the unit of analysis. Concerning  the region effects we also 
obtained, it is possible that hospitals belonging to the same area share clinical guidelines or experience; 
hence, they might cluster the likeliness of developing a procedure at the regional level. Incentives and 
hospital restriction policies might also be shared. Furthermore, in concordance with the clustering of 
complications on the demand side, hospitals within the same area and perceiving a given prevalence of 
complications,  might  bargain similar contractual arrangements with the insurer. Conversely, public 
hospitals appear to be more likely to perform vaginal deliveries. This trend might be consequence of 
reduced incentives for public hospital physicians to perform cesarean sections. 
 
 Physicians’ factors might also generate clustering on the choice of procedures. For example, it is 
possible that physicians do not experience a substantial degree of mobility during their lives; allowing 
them to share experiences with colleagues practicing in the same region and leading them to exhibit 
“school effects” on the performing of procedures (Epstein and Nicholson, 2009). Future research on 
physician mobility and school effects in Colombia is recommended to answer these questions.  Another 
plausible factor is the risk of being sued. For example, physicians taking care of higher-income or more 
educated mothers could perceive a higher risk of facing legal actions if any complication arises during 
delivery leading them to carry out “defensive choices” (Vimercati et al., 2000). Supply induced demand is 
a variable determining positively  the likeliness of performing cesarean sections. Even though,  this 
variable might generate cluster effects at the hospital level, it is also feasible that, as hospitals share 
contractual arrangements with insurers, they may also share the physician wage structure, leading to 
clustering effects at the region level. 
 
Because we assess  data from a single insurer, these results should be carefully inferred  when 
considering other  populations. We strongly suggest the inclusion of useful variables for small-area 




7  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, a multilevel analysis (using data from a private Contributory Regimen insurer) is used to 
estimate the clustering effects of hospitals on the performance of cesarean sections. Two models with 
different specifications are provided. The first estimates the whole variance attributable to the hospital. 
The second model presents a variance decomposition specification in order to estimate what fraction of 
the hospital-attributable variance is due to the geographic region the hospital is situated in.  
 
In this research, regional effects on the probability of performing cesarean section are found.  In 
addition, this paper goes further and finds clustering effects at the health facility level, which is a more 
intuitive unit of analysis than regions. Some important findings are obtained. First, both the region and the 
health facility explain a considerable fraction of the variance on in performing cesarean sections. Unlike 
the previous literature, this paper proves that the effect of hospitals are relevant and that only a fraction of  
this effect can be explained by the region, challenging preceding approaches in which the geographical 
area comprises the unit of analysis. Moreover, this paper uses hierarchical methods, which may be more 
appropriate since they fit the data structure better than earlier linear techniques. We also find that the 
mother’s income and any completion of superior education are significantly more likely to correlate with 
having cesarean sections. Given that out of pocket payments do not play a role on the choice of the 
procedure, such a result reveals how patient preferences might actually affect the likeliness of undergoing 
a cesarean section. 
 
These results show that taking steps to  improve informational asymmetries  and  to increase the 
standardization of procedures is urgently needed for this insurer. Further research at the national level and 
with other medical procedures  is highly recommended to figure out the extent  of this problem in 
Colombia. 
 
Regarding future research on small-area variation in health care, clustering by healthcare providers or 
insurers rather than broad geographical areas is suggested since sometimes it lacks an intuitive basis and 
ignores the effect of smaller units as the source of variation. We recommend the use of hierarchical rather 
than linear methods to estimate clustering effects because these techniques fit better the data and provide 
useful additional information.  
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